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Abstract
The security in current communications recommend to develop the implemen-
tation of cryptographic primitives and algorithms in an effective way. The cryp-
tosystem proposed by Chor and Rivest, which is based on the knapsack problem,
has recently been broken by Vaudenay but only when the original parameters are
used. In this paper we give a brief overview of some developments in Cryptogra-
phy and we present a safe implementation for Chor-Rivest Cryptosystem by using
Magma software.
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1 Introduction
As it is well known, the goal of Cryptography is to guarantee the secrecy, confidentiality
and integration of communications between several users. Moreover, the objective of
Cryptanalysis is to break the security and privacy of such communications ([7], [8]). In
public-key Cryptography each user has two different keys. One of them is the public
key, which is publicly known and it is used by any sender to encrypt messages. The
second key is the private key, which is kept in secret by the receiver and it is used
by him to decrypt encrypted messages. In general, Public Key Cryptography bases
its security on the computational intractability of some Number Theory problems, as
factorization problem, discrete logarithm problem and knapsack problem.
An important public-key cryptosystem based on the knapsack problem was pro-
posed by Chor and Rivest (see [3], [4]). This cryptosystem uses the arithmetic of finite
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fields and it needs to compute discrete logarithms over that field to determine the
keys of the system. Nevertheless, the security of the system depends on the knapsack
problem but not on the Discrete Logarithm Problem. In fact, if this problem becomes
tractable, then the Chor-Rivest cryptosystem will be easier to implement.
The Discrete Logarithm Problem is nowadays considered a very difficult problem
because the best algorithm known for solving it is the number field sieve ([10]) which
has a subexponential expected running time:
O
(
e((64/9)
1/3+o(1))(ln p)1/3(ln ln p)2/3)
)
.
The problem can be defined as follows: Given a prime integer p, a generator α of the
group Z∗p, and an element β ∈ Z∗p, find an integer x, 0 < x ≤ p− 1, such that β = αx.
The Chor-Rivest cryptosystem has been broken by Vaudenay ([11]). Nevertheless,
it was only broken for the original proposed parameters, i.e., over finite fields of qh
elements, Fqh , with q ≈ 200 and h ≈ 25, and h having a small divisor. In order to
avoid Vaudenay’s attack, it has been proved ([5]) that the values of the parameter h
for which no divisor s verifies the equation h/s+ 1 ≤ s are those for which h is either
a prime number or the square of a prime number.
A secure Magma implementation of the Chor-Rivest cryptosystem is presented in
this communication. This implementation uses new parameters, q = 409, and h = 17,
which convert this cryptosystem in a safe system due to the fact that no attack has
been presented when q and h are both prime numbers. The implementation includes
procedures to transform the original messages in a suitable way, to generate the keys,
and to encrypt and to decrypt messages in Fqh .
2 The Chor-Rivest cryptosystem implemented in Magma
We present theMagma procedures ([2]), functions, and statements needed to transform
the messages, generate keys, encrypt, and decrypt messages using the Chor-Rivest
cryptosystem, with a pair of real parameters safer than the original ones. Namely, we
show the outputs of the implementation when the values q = 409 and h = 17, both
prime numbers, are considered. That is, when the finite field is F40917 .
Magma ([1]) is a Computer Algebra System for solving problems in Algebra, Num-
ber Theory, Geometry and Combinatorics that may involve sophisticated mathematics
and which are computationally hard. Magma provides a mathematically rigorous envi-
ronment which emphasizes structural computation. Since the computation in Magma
takes place in one or more algebraic structures, the first step in any computation in-
volves defining those algebraic structures. Once the structures have defined, elements
and other related objects of these structures may be created.
The parameters and the keys of the cryptosystem are chosen in the following way
(see [3] and [4] for details):
1. Define the finite field F where the discrete logarithms must be calculated. The
simplest way of creating the finite field (Galois field) with q elements in Magma
is to use the function FiniteField or GF, which are synonymous. To define the
univariate transcendental extension Fq[t] of Fq the PolynomialRing command
must be used.
2. Define the extension Fq of F by using the ext command, specifying a generator,
g. In Magma the finite field F is built up as the extension of another finite field
(Fq in our case), called the ground field, by an element called the generator of
the field. The ground field is explicit in the construction when we use ext. An
element of the field that generates the multiplicative group is called primitive.
The function IsPrimitive may be used to check primitivity of an element. If Fq
is a finite field and f(t) is an irreducible polynomial, returned by the statement
IrreduciblePolynomial(Fq, h) of degree h with coefficients in Fq, this creates
an extension of degree h of the ground field Fq, with f as its defining polynomial.
3. Calculate the discrete logarithms. In this case, the best algorithm implemented
in Magma to compute discrete logarithms for finite fields is Pohlig-Hellman al-
gorithm ([9]), which running time is proportional to the square root of the largest
prime l dividing n. This algorithm is always used for any finite field F if l is small
and is also used if F is any non-prime field of characteristic greater than 2.
4. Calculate the noise as a random number in the interval [0, qh − 2] and determine
a permutation of q elements.
5. With the previous procedures and statements, the user have determined the pa-
rameters of the system. Then, he computes and saves his private key (noise, r;
permutation, pi; and generator, g), and finally he computes the discrete loga-
rithms ai and determines the elements of his public key (the knapsack), ci, which
could be saved in a file and made public.
The public key of the user is the set (c0, c1, . . . , cq−1), and his/her private key is
the set (t, g, pi, r).
Moreover, for this system, the messages must be binary vectors of length q and
weight h. So, we suppose that this is the form of a message.
In addition to the previous commands, other commands must to be used. For
example, Eltseq command, which converts the input parameter of the finite field F
and its representation as a polynomial in the generator of F over a subfield Fq, with
coefficients in Fq; CodeToString and StringToCode commands for converting between
a one-character string and the character code that it has in the computers operating
system; and Intseq(a, b) command which gives the sequence [a0, a1, . . . , an] which is
the representation of a = a0b0 + a1b1 + . . .+ anbn in the base b.
In [6] an implementation by using Maple software was presented, but it is less
efficient than the one shown here. In both implementations, most of the time of CPU
is spent in the calculation of discrete logarithms. In the example presented in [6], the
process of generation of the parameters and keys required 76.42 minutes, but with our
implementation in Magma this time was reduced to 2.22 minutes on a Intel Core 2
CPU T7200 2.00 GHz, 2.00 GB RAM.
3 Conclusions
We have studied and implemented the Chor-Rivest cryptosystem with Magma soft-
ware. The implementation of this cryptosystem was made with safe parameters, that
is, q = 409, h017 in an efficient way. This implementation includes functions to trans-
form the messages, procedures to generate the keys, encrypt and decrypt messages in
the finite field Fqh . The implementation opens a door to the future in order to use the
Chor-Rivest cryptosystem in a realistic way due to the fact that no attack has yet been
proposed when the parameters q and h are both prime numbers.
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